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INTRODUCTION
Under the indifference principle in contract law, the remedies for
breach of contract should “leave the [promisee] absolutely indifferent, in
subjective terms, between having the defendant breach and pay damages or
having the defendant perform.” 1 This principle underlies the expectationbased remedies that are central to contract law—in particular, the expectation measure of damages, which serves as a surrogate for the “indifference
principle.” 2
Traditional economic analysis recognized that the expectation measure
is supported by strong reasons of efficiency. 3 Recently, however, some lawand-economists have criticized the expectation measure, and by implication
the indifference principle, on instrumental grounds. The criticisms fall into
two categories. Some critics argue that the goals of the indifference principle would be best served by modifying the expectation measure.4 Other
critics argue that contract law should aim to achieve other goals entirely and
then develop alternative economic models and remedial regimes based on

1. Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 636 (1988); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in
Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 979-80 (2005). For a variety of reasons, the expectation measure is an imperfect surrogate for the indifference principle, but for ease of exposition, we will use the two terms more or less interchangeably unless the context indicates
otherwise. Also for ease of exposition, we will use the term contract in this Article to mean a
bargain contract.
2. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 979-80.
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, at 55-56 (1st ed.
1972).
4. See infra Part II.
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those goals. 5 Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the strengths of the
indifference principle and the expectation measure. Parts II and III consider
prominent alternative models and remedial regimes.
This Article has a substantive and a methodological aspect. The substantive aspect analyzes the validity of the alternative models and regimes
apart from questions of administrability and institutional issues. The methodological aspect examines the administrability of these models and regimes and the congruence between the models and regimes, on the one
hand, and institutional considerations, on the other.
I. THE INDIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE AND THE EXPECTATION MEASURE
In this Part, we briefly discuss the instrumental and noninstrumental
strengths of the indifference principle and the expectation measure. The
instrumental strengths consist of efficient incentives for performance and
precaution and support for investment in surplus-enhancing reliance. The
noninstrumental strength consists of the promotion of fairness between contracting parties.
A. Efficient Rate of Performance by Promisors
After a contract has been formed, events may give a promisor an incentive not to perform. For example, the promisor’s cost of performance
may increase significantly, or a new and more profitable opportunity may
arise that is available to the promisor only if she breaches her contract with
the promisee. Contracts are designed to enhance the wealth, or surplus, of
the contracting parties. Accordingly, a decision to breach rather than to perform should account for the effect of the decision on the joint surplus that
would result from performance. The expectation measure accomplishes this
objective because it causes the promisor to consider not only the benefits of
breach to her, but also the resulting costs and loss of benefits to the promisee. At least in theory, therefore, that measure efficiently sweeps the contract’s entire value into the promisor’s calculus of self-interest and thereby
provides efficient incentives for a promisor’s perform-or-breach decision. 6

5. See infra Part III. Many of the alternative models and regimes are synthesized,
elaborated, or developed in Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A
Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135 (2003).
6. For a more formal introduction to the ways in which the expectation measure
promotes efficient rates of performance, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS 247-49 (5th ed. 2008).
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B. Efficient Rate of Precaution by Promisors
One reason that a promisor may breach is that the contract has become
unprofitable to her because of some unwelcome event that increases her
costs but does not constitute an excuse for nonperformance. Often the promisor could have forestalled this reason for breach if she had taken appropriate precautions against the occurrence of the relevant event.7 Precaution
involves costs in the form of money, time, and effort. From an efficiency
standpoint, however, these costs must be balanced against the resulting benefit—a reduction in the probability of breach, and a consequent enhancement of the likelihood that the potential joint surplus under the contract will
be realized. The expectation measure provides an incentive for an efficient
rate of precaution for the same reason that it provides an incentive for an
efficient rate of performance. 8 Incentives for precaution are efficient if they
compel the promisor to balance the cost of precaution against the cost of
failing to take precaution, including the cost of the increased risk to the
promisee of losing his share of the prospective joint surplus. By placing that
increased risk on the promisor, the risk will be swept “into the promisor’s
calculus of self-interest in making decisions on” how much precaution to
take. 9
C. Surplus-Enhancing Reliance by Promisees
Once a contract has been made, a contracting party may take various
actions in reliance upon it. Some of these actions are required by the contract, but others are within the party’s discretion. Discretionary reliance
typically enables the promisee to increase the surplus that he will derive
from the contract. Goetz and Scott developed this concept and called it beneficial reliance. 10 An equivalent term is surplus-enhancing reliance. Here is
an example: The Blue Angels, a rock group, contracts with Promoter to give
a concert in three months. Promoter can greatly increase box-office receipts,
and therefore the value of the contract, by advertising the concert in ad-

7. See generally Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model
of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985) (comparing the incentives provided by expectation
damages to take precautions against breach with incentives provided by tort law to take
precautions against accidents).
8. Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the
Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1336, 1361-62 (2003).
9. Id. at 1336.
10. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1266-67 (1980).
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vance. Advertising therefore constitutes surplus-enhancing reliance.11 A
promisor may also benefit from the promisee’s surplus-enhancing reliance
because some of the projected enhanced surplus may be impounded into the
price the promisee is willing to pay. In The Blue Angels, for example, Promoter may pay The Blue Angels a higher fee than he otherwise would if he
can confidently spend money on advertising, which will increase his expected receipts and therefore his expected profits.
The expectation measure supports a promisee’s investment in beneficial reliance. A promisee who knows that expectation damages give the
promisor strong and appropriate incentives to perform, and to take appropriate precaution against breach, can be more confident that his investment in
surplus-enhancing reliance is not subject to an undue risk of loss. The promisee therefore will be more willing to make the investment.
D. Fairness
Finally, there are strong reasons of fairness for a remedial regime
based on the indifference principle. If A has rendered a bargained-for performance to B, we know that A was willing to render that performance to B
for the agreed-upon price. We cannot know whether A would have rendered
that performance to B for any lesser price. Requiring A to accept any lesser
price would therefore unfairly convert A from a voluntary to an involuntary
actor because if A had known in advance that the contract price was not
enforceable in full, he might not have agreed and performed. Even where A
has only partially performed, he may have done so because he expected full
payment; and even where A has not yet begun to perform, he may have relied on the contract by forgoing or failing to explore other opportunities
whose value is now difficult to quantify. In these cases, too, fairness normally requires that A be allowed to measure damages based on the price that
induced him to act or forbear. In many or most cases, allowing a promisor
to limit damages to less than the promisee’s expectation would also have the
same unfair quality as allowing a promisor to renege on a fair bet that he
made and lost. 12
***
In short, there are strong and widely accepted reasons for believing
that the expectation measure provides promisors and promisees with incentives for efficient performance and precaution, and provides promisees with
11. For a more complete discussion of the implications of beneficial reliance on
efficient damages, see Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1340, from which this example is drawn.
12. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 980.
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support for efficient investment in surplus-enhancing reliance. Within recent
years, however, some law-and-economists have argued either that important
revisions need to be made in the expectation measure to better attain these
goals or that contract law should pursue other goals entirely. In Part II, we
consider some of the former arguments; in Part III, some of the latter.
A major weakness of recent alternative remedial models and regimes
is that they ignore noninstrumental considerations, and in particular, fairness. That having been said, in the balance of this Article we will consider
the alternative damages models and regimes on their own instrumental
terms because analyses based solely on those terms are sufficient to demonstrate that the models and regimes are gravely flawed.
II. CRITIQUES OF THE EXPECTATION MEASURE THAT AIM TO BETTER
IMPLEMENT THE INDIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE
A. The Theory of Overreliance
One critique of the expectation measure that is basically designed to
better implement the indifference principle, rather than to replace it, is the
theory of overreliance. This theory is as follows:
(i)

If a promisor breaks a bargain contract, the promisee will ordinarily sue for
expectation damages, not reliance damages; however, the promisee’s lost
profits, and therefore his expectation damages, may be higher if he has engaged in surplus-enhancing reliance. 13

(ii) There is always some probability that a promisor will breach. 14
(iii) The expectation measure fully insures a promisee against the promisor’s
breach. 15
(iv) This full insurance allows a promisee to ignore the probability that a promisor
will breach, and therefore gives the promisee an incentive to invest in surplusenhancing reliance at a level that is inefficient because it does not take that
probability into account. To put this differently, the expectation measure may
lead a promisee to inefficiently overrely; that is, to overinvest in surplusenhancing reliance. 16
(v) In contrast, an efficient remedial regime would require a promisee to calibrate
his investment in reliance according to the probability that the promisor will
breach. 17

13. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1338, 1341.
14. Id. at 1337.
15. Id. at 1338.
16. Id.
17. See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON.
466, 469-72 (1980); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99
Q.J. ECON. 121, 123-24 (1984) [hereinafter Design of Contracts].
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The theory of overreliance was developed by Steven Shavell.18 It is a
refinement of, rather than a counter to, the expectation measure. The theory
is sound in principle, but when administrability and other institutional considerations are taken into account, the theory has a very limited ambit.19
1. Cases in Which Overreliance Is Impossible
To begin with, overreliance is often impossible. For example, expectation damages are often invariant to reliance. Where that is the case, an increase in the promisee’s beneficial reliance will not increase his expectation
damages, and the prospect of expectation damages therefore will not give
the promisee an incentive to overrely. Take, for example, a seller’s damages
for a buyer’s breach of a contract for the sale of goods. Sellers rarely suffer
compensable consequential damages, because “‘[a] buyer’s usual default is
failure to pay. In normal circumstances, the disappointed seller [of goods]
will be able to sell to another, borrow to replace the breaching buyer’s
promised payment, or otherwise adjust its affairs to avoid consequential
loss.’” 20
Accordingly, in the case of a contract for the sale of goods, a seller
normally cannot increase its consequential damages by overreliance. Moreover, a seller also normally cannot increase its general damages by overreliance. Three alternative formulas can be employed to calculate a seller’s
general damages for a buyer’s breach of a contract for the sale of goods.
One formula is the difference between the unpaid contract price and the
market price at the time and place for tender.21 A second is the difference
between the contract price and the price that the seller realizes on a resale to
a third party that satisfies certain conditions. 22 Under both these formulas, a
seller cannot increase its recovery by investing in beneficial reliance, because contract price, market price, and resale price are all normally invariant
to beneficial reliance. The third formula is the variable costs incurred by the
seller prior to the buyer’s breach plus the seller’s expected profit as measured by the difference between the contract price and seller’s total variable
costs. 23 An increase in a seller’s variable costs will increase the costs18. Design of Contracts, supra note 17, at 123-24.
19. The discussion of the theory of overreliance in this Section is an adaptation and
revision of portions of Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, which includes a much more
extensive critique of the theory. See also Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front
Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98, 98
(1996).
20. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1349-50 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-710
preliminary cmt. 2 (Proposed Amendments 2001)).
21. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (2012).
22. § 2-706.
23. See § 2-708(2).
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incurred element of this formula, but it will drive down the lost profit element by an equal amount, so that here too a seller’s damages will normally
be invariant to his beneficial reliance.
The analysis for a seller’s damages in services contracts is very similar. Such damages can be calculated using several alternative formulas. One
such formula is based on the variable costs incurred by the seller prior to the
buyer’s breach, plus the seller’s expected profit as measured by the difference between the contract price and seller’s total variable costs. An increase
in a seller’s variable costs will increase the costs-incurred element of this
formula but will drive down the lost profit element by an equal amount, so
that here too a seller’s damages will normally be invariant to his beneficial
reliance. An algebraically equivalent formula is the difference between the
contract price and the variable costs remaining to be incurred by the seller at
the time of breach. 24 As in the cases of contracts for the sale of goods, the
contract price, market price, and resale price are invariant to the seller’s
reliance, and an increase in costs prior to breach will increase the costsincurred element of the seller’s recovery but decrease the profit element.
Accordingly, the seller cannot overrely, for comparable reasons.
In short, under the damage formulas that are applicable to breach by a
buyer of goods or services, the expectation measure normally cannot give a
seller an incentive to overinvest in reliance. Accordingly, overreliance can
almost never be a problem in the case of a breach by half of all contracting
parties—that is, by buyers.
In the case of breach by sellers of goods or services, overreliance by a
buyer is possible but often unlikely. Overreliance normally cannot increase
the buyer’s general damages because (as in the case of the seller’s damages)
those damages are measured by formulas that are invariant to the buyer’s
investment in beneficial reliance. One formula for measuring a buyer’s general damages for breach by a seller is based on the difference between the
contract price and the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach. 25 A second formula is based on the difference between the contract
price and the cover price where the buyer covers. 26 A third formula, diminished-value damages, is based on the difference between the market value
of the performance that the seller promised and the market value of the performance that the seller rendered. 27 A fourth formula, cost-of-completion
24. There are wrinkles in these general-damages formulas, which concern payments
by the buyer prior to the breach. These wrinkles do not affect the present discussion and are
omitted for ease of exposition.
25. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-713.
26. U.C.C. § 2-711.
27. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(a) (1981). As in the case
of the seller’s damages, there are wrinkles in the formulas, but they can be ignored for present purposes.
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damages, is based on the amount required to put the seller’s imperfect performance into the promised state.28 Under any of these formulas, an increase
in the buyer’s investment in beneficial reliance normally will not increase
the buyer’s general damages, because normally contract price, market price,
cover price, diminished value, and cost of completion are all invariant to the
buyer’s beneficial reliance. Accordingly, where a buyer can recover only
general damages, as is often the case, he has no incentive to overrely.
2. Cases in Which Overreliance, Although Possible, Is Very Unlikely
to Occur
Unlike a seller’s general and consequential damages and a buyer’s
general damages, a buyer’s consequential damages may be increased by
investment in beneficial reliance. In practice, however, in many or most
cases overreliance by a buyer is very unlikely to occur because even where
a buyer’s profits will vary with his investment in beneficial reliance, it
would often be inefficient for the buyer to take the seller’s probability of
breach into account in determining how much beneficial reliance he should
invest in. This is specifically true in cases involving lumpy reliance or coordinated contracts. It is more generally true because expectation damages do
not perfectly insure promisees.
a. Lumpy Reliance
The theory of overreliance implicitly assumes that reliance expenditures are continuous. In the real world, however, these expenditures are often lumpy (that is, non-continuous). If a buyer’s investment in surplusenhancing reliance occurs in lumps that cannot feasibly be scaled down at
the margin, it will usually be inefficient for the buyer to take the seller’s
probability of breach into account in determining the amount of his reliance.
To illustrate, “[s]uppose Boatmaker agrees to build a commercial yachtto
be named Seafarerfor [Mariner], who plans to charter out the yacht for
luxury cruises.” 29 Mariner cannot charter out Seafarer unless the vessel is
equipped with a customized radar and ten expensive high-tech life preservers, all of which Mariner, rather than Boatmaker, is responsible for.30 Assume Mariner will earn a profit of $30,000 per month from chartering Seafarer. The radar must be ordered two months in advance, and the life preservers must be ordered four weeks in advance. The probability that Boatmaker will breach is 10%. If Boatmaker breaches and Mariner must resell
the radar and life preservers on the market, Mariner will take a loss of
28.
29.
30.

E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(b) (1981).
Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1340.
This example is drawn from Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1354.
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$6,000 on the radar and $500 on the life preservers. On these facts, if Mariner does not order a radar until Seafarer is delivered, he will lose two
months of profits, or $60,000. Since Mariner cannot purchase 90% of a radar, he should order the radar in advance despite the 10% chance that
Boatmaker will breach. Similarly, Mariner should order ten life preservers,
despite the 10% chance that Boatmaker will breach, because nine life preservers will not do Mariner any good.
b. Coordinated Contracts
A similar problem arises where a buyer must enter into a number of
coordinated contracts. In these cases it is normally inefficient for the buyer
to enter into less than all the contracts even if there is a positive probability
of breach for each contract. For example, suppose that to make a movie a
producer needs to make contracts with a writer, a director, five actors, a
cinematographer, a composer, and a film editor, and each artist has a 10%
probability of breach. 31 If production could not begin until all ten artists had
signed contracts, it would be inefficient for the producer to make contracts
with only nine artists. 32
c. Highly Limited Insurance
That overreliance can occur only in a very limited range of cases
leaves the theory of overreliance unaffected in principle, although highly
circumscribed in practice. But there is also a flaw in a central tenet of the
theory: that the expectation measure fully insures a promisee’s investment
in reliance. It is this supposed feature of the expectation measure that is said
to lead to overreliance. For example, Richard Craswell states that
“[b]ecause the expectation measure guarantees [the promisee] B full compensation whether [the promisor] S performs or not . . . it means that B can
ignore the risk that S’s nonperformance might leave B’s reliance expenditures wasted,” 33 and that “expectation damages allow B to capture all of the
upside potential of his reliance without making him bear any of the downside potential.” 34
If institutional factors are taken into account, however, the fullinsurance tenet is incorrect. When a promisee determines how much to invest in beneficial reliance, he cannot rationally expect that his investment
31. Id. at 1355.
32. Id.
33. Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 365, 376-77 (1989) (emphasis added).
34. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV.
481, 494 (1996).
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will be fully insured by expectation damages. 35 What matters to a promisee
is the expected present value of the damages he will receive in the actual
world. 36 In determining that value, the promisee must discount his expected
recovery for breach to reflect litigation risks and litigation costs. 37
Litigation risks include the risks of factfinding error by a judge or jury
and the risk that the promisor may establish a legal defense that prevents the
promisee from recovering all or part of his losses. Damages based on surplus-enhancing reliance entail high litigation risks because they
consist in whole or in part of lost profits, which are [always] difficult to measure
and subject to [various] defenses, such as the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale38
and the requirement of certainty. Moreover, because lost profits are unliquidated
[in amount, there is a risk that even if the promisee prevails,] the court may not
award [him] pre-judgment interest, so that the [present] value of a future recovery
may also need to be discounted by the time value of money. 39

Given these and other litigation risks, in the case of surplus-enhancing reliance the expected value of actual-world expectation damages is unlikely to
exceed 70-80% of a promisee’s actual losses.
Litigation costs include attorney’s fees and the opportunity costs of the
promisee’s time because the promisee must bear those costs even if he wins.
Based on casual empiricism, the minimum legal fee for even a relatively
straightforward commercial breach-of-contract case is often around $10,000
to $20,000, and the minimum fee for a complex high-value case is likely to
range from $50,000 to several hundred thousand dollars. 40
The promisee’s litigation risks are a form of co-insurance because they
require the promisee to bear the difference between his actual damages and
the expected value of his damages. 41 The promisee’s litigation costs are a
form of deductible because the promisee will have a net recovery only
above and beyond those costs. “As Cooter points out, deductibles ‘in effect
divide liability between insured and insurer, giving the insured incentive to
take more precaution than he would have otherwise.’ The same is true of
co-insurance.” 42 If the expectation measure is viewed as a form of insurance, it is subject to brutal co-insurance and deductibles. Far from being
fully insured, therefore, a promisee who overrelies is likely to shoot himself
in the foot. Indeed, given litigation risks and litigation costs, a prudent

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
omitted).
40.
41.
42.

Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1357.
Id.
Id. at 1357-58.
Hadley v. Baxendale, (1864) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.
Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1358 (footnote inserted) (footnote
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1359-60.
Id. at 1358 (footnote omitted) (quoting Cooter, supra note 7, at 39).
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promisee is more likely to underinvest in surplus-enhancing reliance than to
overinvest. 43
3. The Extreme Difficulty of Administering the Theory
Finally, the theory of overreliance would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to administer. For most practical purposes, the promisor is the
only practicable source of information on the probability that she will
breach any given contract, and the promisee will have little reliable information on which to base such a determination. 44 For the same reason, it will
often be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to determine what the promisee’s optimal level of reliance was and whether he relied to a greater extent
than optimal. Moreover, even if the court is able to determine that the promisee had overrelied, and to what extent he had overrelied, the court would
still “have to determine how much profit the promisee would have made if
he had optimally relied.” 45
***
43. We are indebted to Aaron Edlin for this observation.
44. Richard Craswell has proposed an ingenuous rule to solve this problem: the
promisor would be required to state the probability that he will breach, and the promisee
would be entitled to base the amount of her reliance on that statement whether or not the
statement was accurate. See Craswell, supra note 33, at 367-68. Under this rule, the actual
probability of breach would be irrelevant; only the probability stated by promisor would
count. Id. This rule, however, would present its own difficulties because even the promisor is
unlikely to have a good fix on the probability that he will breach any given contract. Craswell suggests that this problem can be dealt with by employing a model in which a promisor
will breach if his cost of performance will exceed the contract price plus the damages he
would be required to pay if he breached. Id. However, at the time the contract is made a
promisor will almost never know the amount of the promisee’s damages upon breach. Typically, a promisee will not disclose to the promisor the amount of profits she expects to make.
Furthermore, until breach actually occurs, the promisee often will not know how much his
damages will be because circumstances often change between the time a contract is made
and the time of breach. The promisor’s costs of performance may also change during that
time. Finally, Craswell’s model of breach is incomplete because it does not take into account
that in determining whether to breach the promisor will consider the effect of breach on her
reputation. This element will also be difficult for either party to quantify, especially because
the injury to the promisor’s reputation will vary according to the circumstances of the breach,
the injury caused by the breach, and the publicity given to the breach. The bottom line is that
even under Craswell’s model of breach, a promisor typically will not know, at the time the
contract is made, the probability that he will breach. In short, at the time a contract is made,
the promisor will not know her cost of performance, the damages she will be required to pay
if she breaches, and whether her cost of performance will exceed the contract price plus those
damages. Accordingly, a promisor’s statement of that probability will normally be inaccurate. Because the social costs of overreliance (if any) depend on the actual probability of
breach, not on the promisor’s stated probability of breach, Craswell’s model would not resolve the difficulty he addresses.
45. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1371.
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In conclusion, the theory of overreliance posits that the “expectation
measure provides inefficient incentives to a promisee because it insures the
promisee’s reliance. In the absence of institutional considerations, the theory could have significant consequences in designing the law of contract
damages. When institutional considerations are taken into account, however, the theory has virtually no consequences”: 46 (1) In most cases, overreliance normally either cannot or will not occur because, of the way in which
the “expectation measure is instantiated in specific rules,” 47 the actual economics of contracting, or both; (2) expectation damages do not in fact insure
the promisee’s reliance; and (3) in any event, the theory is not administrable
by either contracting parties or courts.
B. Adjusting for Enforcement Errors
Economists have long recognized that without adjustments to conventional remedies, the law will be unable to cause wrongdoers to fully internalize the costs of their actions because not all victims successfully enforce
their rights. Some victims do not know they have been wronged. 48 Other
victims know they have been wronged but do not sue. 49 Others sue but fail
to establish their meritorious claims in court or settle for less than the full
value of their claims. 50
Cooter and Ulen call this the problem of enforcement errors.51 Economists have long suggested that for remedial regimes to be efficient, they
must account for the possibility that wrongdoers know they might escape
some or all liability due to such errors.52
The general analysis of enforcement errors is commonly applied to
tort and criminal law.53 Economists’ traditional solution to the problem of
enforcement errors in tort law is that damages should be increased by a percentage that will offset the wrongdoer’s chance of escaping full liability.
For example, if tortfeasors are caught only 50% of the time, damages should
46. Id. at 1373-74.
47. Id. at 1374.
48. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631,
636 (1980).
49. See id.; Shawn J. Bayern, Explaining the American Norm Against Litigation, 93
CALIF. L. REV 1697, 1697 (2005).
50. Contract plaintiffs have some reasons for settling, or not suing, that tort plaintiffs
might not share. For example, a contract plaintiff might aim to make up his loss on the contract at issue in future dealings with his contracting partner, may write off an occasional loss
as a cost of maintaining a relationship with that partner, and so forth.
51. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 396-97.
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., id. at 393-97 (explaining enforcement errors in tort law); id. at 493-99
(explaining enforcement errors in criminal law).
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be doubled; 54 if they are caught only 25% of the time, damages should be
quadrupled. 55
1. Enforcement Errors in Contract Law and the Subjective Beliefs of
Promisors
Some law-and-economists have argued in favor of applying an enforcement-error analysis to contract law as well. For example, suppose a
promisor can perform at a cost of $500 and knows that her breach will cost
the promisee $1,000. Under the expectation measure, if there were no prospect of enforcement errors, the promisor would perform rather than breach
because she would rather pay $500 to perform than $1,000 to remedy a
breach. However, if the promisor expects that the probability she will be
held liable is less than 50%, she would rather breach than perform—at least
if she is selfish and the breach is not expected to result in other costs, such
as litigation expenses or reputational damage. The prospect of enforcement
errors therefore may appear to undermine the efficient incentives provided
by the expectation measure, unless that probability is factored into damages.
As this example suggests, although arguments based on enforcement
errors commonly rest on the probability of enforcement, 56 what matters fundamentally is the promisor’s subjective beliefs about the probability of enforcement. It is these beliefs that motivate the promisor’s perform-or-breach
and precaution decisions. Subjective probabilities are individual probability
estimates. If someone says that the probability that the Large Hadron Collider at CERN will destroy Switzerland is 1%, he says little more than that
he would pay $1 for a chance to win $100 if that happens. He may believe
his estimate is informed by data or carefully honed intuition, but for a subjective interpretation of probability, it need not be. At bottom, it is a personal guess. Ideally, therefore, a remedial regime in contract law that attempted
to correct for enforcement errors would premise damages in large part on
the promisor’s state of mind. The central problem in taking enforcement
errors into account in contract damages is that there is normally no reliable
way to infer the promisor’s state of mind concerning the probability of enforcement.

54. See, e.g., id. at 397.
55. See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and
Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2186 (1999).
56. E.g., id. at 2186 (referring to “the probability that any given violation will be
punished”).
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2. Objective Probabilities and Objective Evidence About Subjective
Probabilities
It might seem that a solution to the problem of a court’s inability, in
the normal case, to determine a promisor’s subjective belief concerning the
probability of enforcement is to infer that belief on the basis of objective
probability. This solution, however, would be highly problematic. One
problem is that the odds are very low that a promisor can accurately predict
the objective probability of enforcement. A related and even more significant problem is that even objective determinations of probability are extremely elusive in the case of one-off (single, non-repetitive) events.57 To
see why this is so, it will be helpful to briefly review and analyze several
different theoretical interpretations of probability. 58
In some settings, probability statements can be understood objectively
rather than subjectively; that is, they may be taken to be statements about
the world rather than statements of an actor’s belief about the world. 59 These
kinds of probability statements are commonly presented in the context of
theoretical games of chance, 60 in which probability statements represent
almost definitional truths. For example, if we define a fair coin to be one for
which heads and tails are equally likely when flipped, then the objective
likelihood the coin will show heads after one particular flip is 50%.61 This is
a statement about the coin and, therefore, about the objective world. Similarly, if we know that 5 of 100 students in a Columbia Law School contracts
class graduated from Columbia College, we can say the odds of drawing the
name of a Columbia College graduate at random from the contracts class
roster is 5%. These statements about probability are just derivations from
axioms; they are, for the most part, just alternative ways of stating what we

57. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1314 (2003) (“Because it is structured
around general reference classes, general attributes, and relative frequencies, the frequentist
account [of probability] is unable to attach a probability number to so-called ‘singular’ propositions absent some restructuring of such propositions in general terms.”).
58. For an introduction to the notion of “interpreting” probability—that is, of trying
to make sense out of the concept—see Alan Hájek, Interpretations of Probability, in STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(Fall
2007
ed.),
available
at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/probability-interpret.
59. As Colin Howson puts it in a helpful summary: “[T]he mathematical theory of
probability seems to be a syntax with not one but two interpretations, one epistemic and the
other objective, one relating to our knowledge of the world and the other to the world independently of our knowledge.” Colin Howson, Theories of Probability, 46 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.
1, 1 (1995).
60. See Hájek, supra note 58.
61. See id.
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already know. Under what is now called classical probability theory, probabilities are little or nothing more than these kind of axiomatic statements. 62
Although objective views of probability are not limited to games of chance
and similarly well-defined idealized situations, they run into difficulties as
they move further away from those settings. Under the leading objective
view of probability, known as frequentism, before estimating the probability
of an event we need to construct a suitable reference class. 63 This prevents
us from speaking of objective probabilities for one-off scenarios, like
whether the Large Hadron Collider will destroy Switzerland. Richard von
Mises, a leading expounder of frequentism, has given the following example: “[Frequentist probability] has nothing to do with questions such as: ‘Is
there a probability of Germany being at some time in the future involved in
a war with Liberia?’ . . . The implication of Germany in a war with the Republic of Liberia is not a situation which frequently repeats itself.” 64
The construction of appropriate reference classes—and the decision
whether a reference class is appropriate—is a matter of judgment. For example, in discussing whether a suitable class of repeating events is available
in a given type of case, von Mises includes dice and molecular systems,
excludes a war between Germany and Liberia, and concludes that “the reliability and trustworthiness of witnesses and judges [is] a borderline case
since we may feel reasonable doubt whether similar situations occur sufficiently frequently and uniformly for them to be considered as repetitive
phenomena.” 65 It is important to recognize that in some cases, as a matter of
judgment, decision makers may need to admit that relying on specific probability figures simply isn’t useful. Without an observed pattern or a theoretical justification for a pattern, it becomes difficult either to reach agreement
on particular probability figures or to put probability figures into practice.
3. The Elusiveness of Objective Probabilities and Objective Evidence
About Subjective Probabilities in Contract Cases
In some areas of law, such as many kinds of accident cases, it may
well be productive to apply objective probabilities or to use objective evidence to infer subjective beliefs about probabilities. For example, if twice as
many automobile accidents occur when automobiles are driven at speed X
than at speed Y, it may make sense to say that the probability of an accident
is twice as high at speed X than at speed Y—and perhaps it also makes
sense to infer that certain actors should have beliefs that accord with that
understanding. However, although a few kinds of breach of contract—such
62.
63.
64.
65.

Cf. id.
Id.
RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 9-10 (2d ed. 1981).
Id. at 10.
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as a manufacturer’s breach of a consumer warranty as a result of a product
defect—might sensibly be analyzed by reference to large classes of events,
in typical contracts cases the construction of a suitable reference class will
be difficult or impossible.
For one thing, by the time a promisor enters into an agreement, she
ordinarily knows the identity of the promisee, the history of the parties’
negotiation, and other situation-specific facts. In most cases, there simply is
no reasonable reference class to use because the individual characteristics of
the transaction—the nature of the contract, amount, timing, negotiating history, personal relationships, locale, and so on—will swamp any general
features of the case and frustrate attempts to generalize. Compare von Mises’s example: Even though wars recur through history, a war between two
particular countries without a history of war against each other is not the
sort of repeating event about which we can say, “This event happens in X of
every Y cases.” 66 Accordingly, even if remedies can rest on objective probabilities (or on objective evidence about subjective probabilities) of enforcement in some areas of law, that means little for contract law, where
singular and individualized injuries and enforcement are the norm.
Moreover, unlike crimes and many torts, breach of contract is typically a private affair, and as a result, relevant data would be difficult to gather
in the first place. It may be relatively easy for a governmental agency, or
even a private organization, to compile statistics about reported but unsolved crimes and then to compute an enforcement error. Similarly, many
torts are publicly observed because, for example, the torts are crimes as
well, or affect many individuals (like toxic torts),67 or occur in public (like
car accidents), or because insurance companies take notice of and assemble
actuarial data on the torts. By contrast, breach of contract tends to fly under
the public radar. If a promisor expects to avoid liability for breach, that is
probably because she believes that the promisee will not detect the breach,
will not be able to prove there was a breach, or will not have the resources
to bring suit. Even if the promisee detects and establishes breach, except in
small cohesive business communities, it is unlikely that the breach will be
reported to any agency or private group interested in and capable of compiling accurate statistics.

66. There are other objective interpretations of probability, see Hájek, supra note 58,
but they do not change our analysis in any important respect. For instance, there is a view
known as logical probability, but it does not attempt to address one-off events more than do
frequentism or classical probability theory. Id. There is also a view known as the propensity
interpretation, which does aim to make theoretical objective sense of one-off events, but not
in a way that makes objective probabilities more available for our purposes. (Propensity
theory was developed to explain the probabilities of one-off events on the quantummechanical level. See id.)
67. See Craswell, supra note 55, at 2189.
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In any event, the details of private contracts and the characteristics of
contracting partners vary so widely that even if reliable statistics could be
gathered concerning the likelihood of underenforcement of contracts as a
whole, particular classes of contracts, or contracts made by a particular
promisor, that data would be virtually unusable as applied to any given contract.
If there are no sensible ways to reach social or theoretical agreement
about probabilities of enforcement in individual contracts cases, it is even
less plausible to imagine that we can reliably infer an individual promisor’s
subjective beliefs about enforcement. Such an inference would not just be a
guess; it would be a guess at a guess. To put this differently, even if there
were a sensible objective probability to which the promisor should have
personally subscribed, the existence of this probability does not imply that
the promisor was able to discern it. Nor would it imply that a court, in setting damages, would be able to expect that the promisor would predict the
court’s level of damages, which would of course be necessary for remedies
to affect the promisor’s behavior.
4. Other Administrative Concerns in Enhancing Contract Damages by
Adjusting for Enforcement Errors
As a result of these factors, estimates of the probability of enforcement
errors in contract law are likely to be both highly speculative and highly
inaccurate. 68 Richard Craswell, who is generally supportive of the recent
work in remedial theory in contract law, nevertheless develops a penetrating
litany of further, related administrative problems that would be raised by
enforcement-error regimes:
As a result [of the administrative costs of an enforcement-error regime based
on subjective estimates of probability,] recent economic analyses have . . . considered the use of multipliers that are the same for all defendants, rather than being
figured separately on a case-by-case basis. Interestingly, if a constant multiplier is
used, the most efficient multiplier will generally be less than the traditional multiplier would suggest, meaning that it will be less than one over the probability of
punishment faced by the average wrongdoer. In some cases, the optimal multiplier
could even be less than one, meaning that damages should be reduced (rather than
augmented) in order to create efficient incentives in the presence of imperfect enforcement. 69

68. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law,
109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1896 (2000) (“Unlike in the tort context . . . where actuarial tables make
the award of a meaningful average measure of damages feasible, using an ‘average expectation’ measure in the contracts context would require courts to make factual determinations . .
. that in most cases they are ill-equipped to make.”).
69. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1168-69 (emphasis added).
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Unfortunately (but perhaps realistically), these analyses also suggest that the
exact size of the efficient multiplier will depend on a number of factors that are
likely to be hard to measure. 70
In short, the analysis of efficient remedies is complicated enough even if we
consider only two sets of consequences: (a) the deterrent effect on wrongdoers, together with (b) the effect on total enforcement costs. That is, even if we limit our
attention to these two effects alone, the most efficient measure of damages could
be either higher or lower than an exactly compensatory measure. 71

In short, even if an economic understanding of enforcement errors is
applicable in tort law or criminal law, achieving a coherent enforcementerror remedial regime in contract law is probably impossible, and such a
regime would certainly be unadministrable.72
C. Taking into Account the Secrecy Interest
In The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa
Bernstein identified and developed what they called the “secrecy interest” in
contract law—that is, the interest of a promisee in not being required to
reveal secret information as a condition to recovering damages in a suit for
breach of contract. 73 For example, a promisee who wishes to establish a
claim for lost profits may not want to reveal secret information about his
suppliers or his costs. The central point of the article is that the rules of contract law and civil procedure fail to take the secrecy interest into account.74
As a result, contract damages tend to be undercompensatory because the
law’s failure to protect the secrecy interest may cause a promisee to forgo
all or part of his claim. 75 Undercompensatory damages, in turn, will fail to
provide incentives for the goals of achieving efficient performance, precaution, and surplus-enhancing reliance.76 Ben-Shahar and Bernstein do not call
into question those goals, the expectation measure, or the indifference principle. Rather, their aim is to bolster those goals, and bring the expectation
measure into closer conformity with the indifference principle, by better
70. Id. at 1169.
71. Id. at 1170-71.
72. Moreover, contracting parties—unlike the parties in a typical tort case—have
some opportunity to minimize in advance the importance of potential enforcement errors. If,
for example, the danger is that breach will be unnoticed, the contract can call for an ongoing
exchange of information among the parties. If the danger is that breach will not be verifiable
to a court, the contract can include a definition of breach that courts can easily apply in a way
that the parties can reliably predict. As a result, there may be reasons to believe that enforcement errors in contract law will be systematically less significant than in other areas of
law.
73. See Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 68, at 1888.
74. Id. at 1889-90.
75. Id. at 1890-91.
76. Id. at 1893.

20

Michigan State Law Review

Vol. 2013:1

assuring that secrecy-sensitive promisees are indifferent between performance, on the one hand, and breach and damages, on the other.77 Accordingly, they write “[w]ith a view toward refining, rather than challenging, the
well-established literature on the economics of contract damages.” 78
The Secrecy Interest points to a real-life problem. However, BenShahar and Bernstein fail to balance the costs of that problem against the
costs of the solutions they propose.
To begin with, Ben-Shahar and Bernstein overweigh the secrecy interest. Observation suggests that promisees regularly sue for lost profits without a substantial concern about the information they must disclose by doing
so. There are a number of reasons why this is so. Many types of damages
depend on formulas whose elements are not secret, such as the difference
between contract price and market price or the difference between the market value of a promised performance and the market value of the performance actually rendered. Next, under the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale79
promisees must often disclose at the time a contract is made that if breach
occurs they will incur lost profits of a certain type, thereby diminishing upfront the amount of information they would otherwise prefer to keep secret.
Furthermore, some kinds of secret information can be shielded in litigation
by a protective order. For example, in In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, a
patent-law suit, the court upheld a protective order that allowed a party to
redact a supplier’s identity, among other secrets.80 Similarly, in CSU Holdings v. Xerox, the court held that the defendant had not demonstrated that it
needed to know the identities of twelve confidential suppliers. 81 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, most secrets have a very short shelf-life, while
litigation is interminable. Accordingly, even if there is secret information
bearing on a contract, which has some value when the contract is made, the
information is likely to have lost most or all of that value before litigation
proceeds very far.
Just as Ben-Shahar and Bernstein overweigh the costs of the secrecy
interest, they underweigh the costs of abolishing or drastically changing the
doctrines they believe undermine that interest. Ben-Shahar and Bernstein
critique a variety of remedial doctrines through the lens of the secrecy interest. 82 Their critiques of cover and mitigation are paradigmatic. As to cover,
they say:
In cases in which an aggrieved buyer has in fact covered, proving that she did so in
an appropriate manner requires her to reveal a great deal of private information.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1897-1901.
Id. at 1924.
Hadley v. Baxendale, (1864) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150; 9 Ex. 341, 353.
312 F. Supp. 2d 653, 669 (D.N.J. 2004).
162 F.R.D. 355, 358 (D. Kan. 1995).
See Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 68.
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Establishing whether cover has taken place necessitates an inquiry into many of the
transactions that the aggrieved party entered into immediately following breach. It
may also require her to reveal sensitive business or market information, the identity
of the next lowest cost supplier and the price at which he is willing to sell, as well
as the identity and price charged by a large number of other market participants. 83

As to mitigation, they say: “A defendant attempting to establish that a
plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages is permitted to take broad discovery
of numerous documents and information that plaintiffs often have a substantial interest in keeping private.” 84 However, the costs of abolishing or drastically cutting back the doctrines of cover and mitigation would be very high.
The duty to mitigate reduces social losses and, thereby, increases social
welfare. Moreover, that duty is based not only on sound policy but also on
morality. If the promisee can reduce damages at little or no cost to himself,
he is morally obliged to do so. Similarly, cover is a central remedy in contract law because it serves as a kind of virtual specific performance. 85 As a
remedy, cover has the look and feel of damages because the buyer ends up
with a money judgment. As an act, however, cover yields many of the benefits of specific performance. 86 By covering, the buyer finds a replacement
performance that, when put together with cover damages, is equivalent to
what the buyer would have received if the seller had been ordered to specifically perform. Where cover can be achieved, it presents four substantial
advantages over both market-price damages and actual specific performance.
First, because the buyer chooses the replacement performance himself,
cover reflects the buyer’s subjective preferences. Therefore, cover avoids
the shortfalls that often result when the buyer’s damages depend on a constructed market price that does not take the buyer’s subjective preferences
into account. Second, in the case of a differentiated commodity, cover damages are often much easier to prove than market-price damages. In such
cases, to prove market-price damages the buyer needs to locate and then
extrapolate information from comparable transactions—a process the seller
will inevitably contest. In contrast, if the buyer covers he may need to show
only the cover price. Third, the act of cover normally prevents or minimizes
the private and social costs of consequential losses. If a seller breaches a
contract to supply an input or a factor of production, timely cover will prevent or minimize the buyer’s loss of profits as a result of the breach. Corre83. Id. at 1912 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 1913.
85. For further discussion of cover, see Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1041-49.
86. Cf. Timothy J. Muris, The Costs of Freely Granting Specific Performance, 1982
DUKE L.J. 1053, 1055-56 (1982) (referring to “specific performance of [a] contract through
the market”); Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61 (1987) (using the phrase “self-help specific performance,” although in a
different context).
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spondingly, timely cover will prevent or minimize the private cost to the
buyer that results from the operation of the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale. 87 Finally, actual specific performance often involves problems concerning the enforcement process, mitigation, and the right to a jury trial.88
Cover does not present these problems.
In contrast to the benefits of the principles of cover and mitigation,
which are very high, the benefits of implementing the secrecy interest
would be extremely low. For example, it is not clear why
[e]stablishing whether cover has taken place . . . may . . . require [an aggrieved
buyer] to reveal sensitive business or market information, the identity of the next
lowest cost supplier and the price at which he is willing to sell, as well as the identity and price charged by a large number of market participants. 89

As a practical matter, normally a buyer will put into evidence a purchase that he claims is cover, and the seller will then have the burden of
coming forward with evidence showing either that the purchase was not
really a replacement for the breached commodity or that the buyer overpaid.
Furthermore, most of the information described by Ben-Shahar and Bernstein in connection with cover is not secret in any event. For example, it is
highly unlikely that “the identity and price charged by a large number of
other market participants” will be known only to the buyer. 90 Similarly, it is
doubtful that a seller who wants to show that a plaintiff failed to mitigate
damages has a broad right to discover secret documents and information.
For example, the issue of mitigation arises most commonly in employment
cases, and it is highly unlikely that a wrongfully discharged employee will
have a trove of valuable relevant secret documents and information relating
to his attempts to mitigate. Much the same will be true in other types of
mitigation cases. Of course, there may be instances where a plaintiff will be
required to reveal secret information in mitigation or cover cases—although
even that is made unlikely by the short shelf life of secret information—but
these instances will not be thick on the ground.
In short, the problem with the remedial regime proposed in The Secrecy Interest is not lack of administrability, but lack of soundness: the proposed regime would throw out the baby with the bathwater. Like the baby,
the remedial doctrines that Ben-Shahar and Bernstein would eliminate or
cut back are extremely valuable. Like the bathwater, in the typical case the
secrecy interest has little or no value.

87.
88.
89.
omitted).
90.

Hadley v. Baxendale, (1864) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150; 9 Ex. 341, 353.
See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1019-22.
Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 68, at 1912 (emphasis added) (footnote
Id. at 1912.
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III. CRITIQUES OF THE EXPECTATION MEASURE THAT REST ON
ALTERNATIVE GOALS FOR REMEDIAL REGIMES IN CONTRACT LAW
Part II discussed remedial regimes that shared the efficiency goals of
the indifference principle and the expectation measure—efficient rates of
performance and precautions, and facilitation of surplus-enhancing reliance—but entailed modifications of that measure to better satisfy the principle. In contrast, some law-and-economists have argued that remedial regimes should serve other goals entirely. In this Part, we consider several of
these proposed regimes.
A. Remedial Regimes Whose Goal Is to Promote Efficient Search for Contracting Counterparties
One possible alternative goal for remedial regimes in contract law is to
promote efficient search for contracting counterparties. Search entails costs,
but if successful can be rewarding. In particular, the joint surplus produced
by one pair of contracting parties may be larger than the joint surplus produced by another, and a party who wants to contract may need to search to
locate the counterparty who will generate the highest joint surplus.
Peter Diamond and Eric Maskin have modeled the effects of remedial
regimes on incentives to conduct efficient searches for contracting partners. 91 Diamond and Maskin emphasize that an actor’s decision to search
for a contracting counterparty affects other searchers because that decision
can influence the matches that other searchers can make. 92 For example, if
an actor decides to search for a condominium in Boca Raton, he gives prospective sellers in Boca a new opportunity to be matched with a buyer.
More generally, a decision to search can either help or hurt other searchers.
New high-quality searchers typically benefit potential counterparties. However, new low-quality searchers can have either positive or negative effects. 93 To simplify somewhat, new low-quality searchers can help existing
searchers by making it easier for them to find someone, but can harm existing searchers by reducing the average quality of potential matches. Given a
pre-set fixed expenditure on search, an existing searcher’s best result is likely to be lower if the average quality of potential matches is reduced by the
entrance of new low-quality searchers.

91. See generally Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of
Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States, 10 BELL J. ECON. 282 (1979) [hereinafter
Diamond & Maskin I]; P.A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search
and Breach of Contract II. A Non-Steady State Example, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 165 (1981).
92. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 91, at 283-86.
93. See id. at 283-84.
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Accordingly, one of Diamond and Maskin’s central concerns is the
positive or negative externalities that result from an actor’s decision to
search for contracting counterparties.94 They argue that a remedial regime
can give actors incentives either to search or not because the regime can
affect both the value of contracts that may result from search (thereby making search potentially more or less valuable) and the cost of breaching an
existing contract to make a new one. 95 That cost matters to Diamond and
Maskin because in their model, even after an actor has entered into a contract she can and often will continue to search for a better counterparty. 96
This theory, however, does not easily translate into practice. As Diamond and Maskin point out:
[H]igher damages induce opposing effects on the incentives for . . . search . . .
sometimes making comparisons with compensatory [that is, expectation] damages
difficult. On the one hand, search is encouraged (relative to compensatory damages) by the greater return higher damages yield when breach [of the new contract]
occurs. On the other hand, search is discouraged by the higher damages set [for
breach under the old contract], which diminish opportunities for breach. 97

In other words, while it is conceivable that a remedial regime that is
based on search, rather than on the indifference principle and the expectation measure, might provide a level of damages that provides better incentives for efficient search activity, Diamond and Maskin do not articulate
such a regime. Indeed, as Craswell has pointed out, “[I]t is difficult to say
whether the optimal measure of damages [for this purpose] would be either
higher or lower than the expectation measure, for this may depend on the
exact structure of the costs and potential returns to search.” 98 Furthermore,
even if an alternative remedial regime were successful at optimizing search
activity, the regime would be likely to promote inefficient perform-orbreach decisions. As Diamond and Maskin state, “Damage rules affect both
search and breach decisions. Only by happy coincidence could a single instrument induce the right decisions in both categories.” 99 It is therefore not
surprising that Diamond and Maskin conclude that no single formula for
damages promotes efficient incentives for both breach and search.100 If any-

94. See id.
95. See id. at 284-85.
96. Cf. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1164-65; Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance,
and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 500 (1996); Richard Craswell, supra note 1, at
649 n.43.
97. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 91, at 284.
98. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1165. For Craswell’s discussion of search externalities, which differs somewhat from that of Diamond and Maskin, see id. at 1164-65.
99. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 91, at 299.
100. See id.
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thing, they suggest, under some conditions “compensatory” (expectation)
damages are probably more efficient than higher measures.101
Diamond and Maskin’s argument suffers from another problem. The
argument implicitly builds on the theory of efficient breach because one of
Diamond and Maskin’s major concerns is to allow parties who have already
contracted to fluidly continue to search for better counterparties. For example, in describing a case of two original pairs of contracting parties in which
one party in each pair breaches and the two breaching parties make a new
contract with each other, Diamond and Maskin state that with compensatory
(that, is expectation) damages, “the incentives for two breaching parties
coincide with efficiency for all four original partners . . . . That is, the two
[breaching] individuals find it in their interest to breach precisely when by
so doing they increase the sum of the expected payoffs of these four partners.” 102
In practice, however, a breach by a promisor—as opposed to a mutually agreed-upon termination—almost never increases the payoff to the promisee as compared to the payoff from the performance, and on the contrary
almost always decreases that payoff. To begin with, a promisor considering
breach typically won’t know whether her gain from breach will exceed her
promisee’s loss, and therefore is not in a position to determine the relative
joint surplus from breach and performance. 103 More important, expectation
damages never make promisees indifferent between breach and performance because, among other things, such damages—and most other types
of damages—generally (1) rest on objective rather than subjective criteria;
(2) are unavailable unless reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract is
made and fairly certain at the time the contract is breached; (3) entail the
loss of the time value of money; and (4) can be recovered only by incurring
high legal fees that normally will not be included in the damage award. 104
Indeed, the theory of efficient breach is actually inefficient. One metric for measuring the efficiency of a contract rule is to ask what rule wellinformed bargaining parties would agree upon if they were bargaining costfree. The theory of efficient breach fails to satisfy this metric, and application of the theory would normally violate the implied terms of the parties’
contracts. For example:
101. See id. at 293. For purposes of discussion, Diamond and Maskin do at times
provide formulas for these measures, but in the end, these formulas do not amount to specific
alternative proposals. See id. at 288-92. Craswell has also proposed that the possibility of
more general precontractual incentives ought to influence the damages awarded for breach of
contract. Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem,
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 402 (1988). For similar reasons, however, the proposal would be
almost impossible to apply, as Craswell recognizes. See id. at 426.
102. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 91, at 284.
103. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 998, 1000.
104. See id. at 989-97.
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Suppose that Seller and Buyer have negotiated a contract under which Seller agrees
to sell a differentiated commodity to Buyer—say a home to live in, custom-made
widgets that Buyer will use as an input in production, or a used die press that Buyer will employ as a factor of production. As the parties are about to sign a written
contract, Seller says to Buyer, “In all honesty, I should tell you that although I have
no present intention to breach this contract, neither do I have a present intention to
perform. If a better offer comes along, I will take it and pay you expectation damages. In fact, I will begin actively looking for a better offer right after we sign this
contract. Let’s insert a provision that recognizes I will do just that.” What would be
Buyer’s likely response? Under the theory of efficient breach, Buyer would say,
“Of course, I expect no more.” Experience strongly suggests, however, that in real
life, most buyers would be surprised if not shocked by such a statement and would
either walk away; insist on an explicit contractual provision stating that the seller
has a present intent to perform and that any profit on breach and resale will go to
buyer; or demand a payment, in the form of a lower price, for the seller’s right to
resell. 105

Accordingly, if it is assumed that contracts between well-informed
parties are efficient, that a contract includes implied as well as express
terms, and that well-informed parties would have refused to permit each
other to search for overbidders unless a premium was paid for the right to
do so, then it is implied in nearly every contract that the seller will not continue to search unless the contract explicitly authorizes her to do so. Consequently, the theory of efficient breach inefficiently remakes the parties’ contract. (Why then don’t contracts explicitly provide that the promisor can’t
continue searching for a new contract partner? For the same reason that
parents don’t tell babysitters not to have sex with the children. The point is
so obvious that no one would think of explicitly addressing it.)
B. Remedial Regimes Whose Goal Is to Eliminate Adverse Selection and
Other Effects of Inefficient Pricing
A well-known issue in tort law is the problem of activity levels. Simply put, if an activity forces others to incur some cost, such as physical injuries, then the activity can occur more often than is efficient even if it is conducted carefully. As Steven Shavell puts it, even an injurer who must pay
damages when he acts negligently may “not be motivated to consider the
effect on accident[al] losses of his choice of whether to engage in his activity or, more generally, of the level at which to engage in his activity.” 106 Similarly, from society’s perspective, victims who are fully compensated for

105. Id. at 1006-07.
106. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1980)
(emphasis omitted).
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injuries that result from their own activity may engage in the activity too
often. 107
This analysis of activity levels in tort law doesn’t carry over to contract law directly. It would make little or no sense to say there are too many
contracts. 108 However, the analysis related to activity levels has suggested to
some that in a contractual setting the expectation measure can give rise to
two related problems, known as cross-subsidization and adverse selection.109
As Craswell notes:
[I]n many contexts users differ [from one another] in the expected damages that a .
. . breach would inflict. For example, if a defective toaster [that is, under warranty]
causes a fire, the consequential damages will be greater for users with expensive
homes and furnishings than they will be for users with modest, working class
homes. 110

However, the argument goes, a manufacturer will normally charge all
customers the same price—a price that impounds the average damages he
will be obliged to pay. 111 This in turn will lead to two problems. First, customers for whom the expected loss is low (for example, those with modest
homes) will be subsidizing customers for whom the expected loss is high
(for example, those with expensive homes).112 This is the problem known as
cross-subsidization. Second, because of cross-subsidization the price to lowexpected-loss customers will be higher than it would be if no customers
carried a high-expected risk. 113 As a result, these customers may be inefficiently discouraged from purchasing the good or service. This is the problem known as adverse selection. 114 Cross-subsidization by itself only transfers wealth; it does not cause a net social loss. However, a net social loss
does arise when cross-subsidization leads to adverse selection. 115 In short, as
with other activity-level arguments, the concern is that some actors will
107. See Craswell, supra note 5, at 1157; Shavell, supra note 106, at 17-20. Of
course, in cases of physical injuries—and in other situations where compensation is imperfect—victims tend to have very strong incentives anyway to avoid being injured.
108. When contracts harm third parties, it can make sense to say there are too many
of them. But such contracts normally ought to be either prohibited (like contracts to commit a
crime) or addressed by tort law (like contracts to engage in an activity that increases the risk
of accidents for third-party victims).
109. See Craswell, supra note 5, at 1158-59.
110. Id. at 1158.
111. Id. at 1159.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. As Craswell notes, cross-subsidization is still problematic because it is likely to
be unfair, particularly because it tends to transfer wealth from richer promisees to poorer
promisees. Id. at 1159. However, this unfairness—to the extent it exists—needs to be compared against the unfairness of remedial regimes that do not adhere to the indifference principle.
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choose inefficient levels of some contractual activities (like purchasing
toasters) because the injuries that result from those activities are subsidized
by others (those with less to lose if the toaster burns down their house).
Craswell puts it as follows:
[F]rom the standpoint of efficient activity levels, the subsidy could produce “adverse selection,” meaning that riskier customers (those who benefit from the subsidy) will use the product excessively, while less risky customers (those who have to
pay the subsidy) will use it too little. In the extreme case, the less risky customers
might even be priced out of the market entirely, leaving only the highest-risk customers to purchase the product. 116

As in the case of other critiques of the expectation measure, these
problems are unlikely to occur in practice, and even if they were likely to
occur, no workable alternative to expectation damages would cure the problems.
1. Contractual Mechanisms to Avoid Cross-Subsidization and Adverse
Selection
Cross-subsidization and adverse selection arise when sellers cannot
differentiate among buyers—that is, when they cannot charge each buyer a
price that corresponds to that buyer’s expected compensable loss.117 However, both contract doctrine and common business arrangements let sellers
differentiate among buyers at little cost. For example, the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale allows a promisee to recover only those damages that were
reasonably foreseeable to the promisor in advance. 118 Because of the Hadley
principle, either a seller will not be liable for a buyer’s abnormally high loss
from breach, or the seller will have information about the prospective loss,
in which case the seller can increase the price accordingly, decline to deal
with the buyer, or contractually limit the buyer’s damages. It is therefore
likely that “all users of the good or service are identical”119—or at least substantially similar—with respect to the amount of damages the seller will
expect to pay in the event of a loss. Moreover, sellers can, at small cost,
either limit their own liability for consequential damages or provide a menu
of liability options and linked prices from which buyers can select the level
of liability they desire.120 Thus, a shipping company might allow buyers to
purchase different levels of “insurance” for packages, and each buyer can
select a level that corresponds to the loss he expects.
116. Id. (footnote omitted).
117. See id. at 1158-59.
118. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1864) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147-48; 9 Ex. 341, 345-46.
119. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1158.
120. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CALIF. L.
REV. 563, 606-08 (1992).
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2. Implications for the Indifference Principle and the Expectation
Measure
Even if cross-subsidization were likely to pose a problem, it is unclear
what to do about it. Craswell proposes no alternative to expectation damages to address the problem, and it is unlikely that a workable alternative is
available. This is not surprising, because adverse selection does not result
from the expectation measure. Rather, it occurs whenever courts compensate individual buyers at different levels in cases where sellers cannot discriminate among customers by predicting these levels and pricing accordingly.
One candidate for responding to the problems of cross-subsidization
and adverse selection would be to award any given injured promisee only
the level of damages suffered by all of the promisor’s injured promisees. 121
We will call this the least-common-denominator measure. This measure is
highly problematic. First, if least-common-denominator damages are nothing or next to nothing because some promisees were almost entirely uninjured by the breach, courts would award nothing or next to nothing to those
promisees—perhaps the great majority—who were injured. Second, a court
that wanted to impose least-common-denominator damages would need to
determine those damages by surveying the entire class of injured promisees—and do so whenever a new case arose, since the population of injured
promisees will fluctuate over time. Courts are completely unequipped to
make such determinations.
There is a broader problem with attempts to respond to adverse selection by proposing an alternative remedy for breach. Adverse selection can
be interpreted as merely a cost that arises from the seller’s lack of information about individual buyers. Changing the remedy for breach does not
eliminate this cost; it merely pretends to avoid the cost by shifting it elsewhere—for example, by leading a buyer who wants compensation for
breach to obtain first-party insurance, in which case the adverse-selection
problem will resurface between the buyer and his insurer.

121. This solution is tentatively proposed by Gwyn D. Quillen, Note, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1140-41 (1988) (“To avoid [crosssubsidization], buyers should be allowed to recover only those damages that all buyers, either
high or low risk, will suffer due to the seller’s breach. Where this principle conflicts with
other goals of remedies for breach of contract, such as inducing the seller to take the optimal
precautions against breach, the problem of cross-subsidization should be weighed against the
problems recovery is intended to address, and the appropriate remedy chosen on a case-bycase basis. Tests such as ‘foreseeability,’ ‘tacit agreement,’ and the ‘necessity of preventing
injustice’ may allow courts to do just that.”).
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C. Efficient Mitigation After Breach
Law-and-economics scholars have long noted what Robert Cooter has
called the “paradox of compensation”: when a wrongdoer internalizes the
full cost of her wrongs, her victims may have diminished incentives or even
no incentives to take precaution against these wrongs.122 Applying this idea
in a contractual setting, Craswell suggests that under a remedial regime that
implements the indifference principle, a promisee may “run up . . . damages
needlessly by continuing to perform after the other party has already announced its breach.” 123
However, such a failure to mitigate is extremely unlikely. Even under
a regime that implements the indifference principle perfectly and thereby
causes promisees to be completely indifferent between performance and
breach, a promisee has no incentive to “run up . . . damages needlessly”124
for their own sake, simply to be reimbursed for them later. Unless the promisee is irrationally spiteful, the only reason he might wish to avoid mitigating his damages is that mitigation may carry some cost. Often, however,
mitigation has no cost. For instance, in Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge
Co., a bridge company entered into an agreement with a county to build a
bridge. 125 The county later decided that it did not want the bridge, instructed
the bridge company not to proceed any further with the bridge, and canceled
construction of a road that was to lead to the bridge.126 Because the county
did not want the bridge, and the bridge was useless without the road, further
construction of the bridge represented a pure social loss. Moreover, this loss
was not reduced by any significant private gain to the bridge company that
would result from the continuation of construction. The company would
have been just as well off if it stopped work and sued for damages as it
would have been if it finished the bridge and was awarded the full contract
price. 127
Even when mitigation does have a cost, the cost is likely to be low because contract law does not require parties to undertake mitigation when it
is unduly costly or risky. 128 Moreover, because compensation for harm is

122. Cooter, supra note 7, at 3-12.
123. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1153-54.
124. Id.
125. 35 F.2d 301, 302 (4th Cir. 1929).
126. Id. at 303.
127. See id. One possible gain to the bridge company from completing construction
would be an addition to the portfolio it could show to prospective customers. However, such
a gain is too uncertain and insignificant to excuse a contractor who continues to work after a
countermand.
128. See, e.g., Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 29 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of San Antonio v. Guidry, 801 S.W.2d 142, 151 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)) (noting that
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never certain, and even expectation damages normally do not fully satisfy
the indifference principle,129 in the real world promisees have little incentive
to run up damages needlessly by incurring costs, since they would run a
significant risk that they would not recover some or even any of the costs.
Furthermore, it is a basic principle of contract law that a promisee who
does not take reasonable steps to mitigate will be unable to recover the losses that result from his failure to mitigate.130 Therefore, promisees who do
not mitigate when it is inexpensive and not risky to do so will lose some or
even all of their damages.
Craswell argues, however, that the doctrine of mitigation may be inefficient because it involves:
Extra administrative costs, by requiring courts to evaluate the victim’s behavior.
[It] may also introduce additional uncertainty, and additional risk of judicial error,
by leaving it to courts to decide what kind of behavior is “reasonable.” For these
reasons, it may sometimes be easier to influence victims’ incentives by reducing
the damages paid to all victims. 131

Accordingly, Craswell suggests that it might be more efficient to remove the duty to mitigate and instead to lower the promisees’ damages systematically in order to recapture the efficient incentives of the duty to mitigate. 132
However, Craswell does no more than raise the possibility that a systematic reduction in damages would be less costly than a determination
about a party’s failure to mitigate. He gives no reason to suppose this would
actually be the case, and it is highly unlikely that it would be. What would
such a reduction look like? Would there be one standard reduction for all
plaintiffs or varying reductions depending on the type of claim? Would the
reduction be reassessed annually? And how would such a reduction be accomplished? If a reduction were to be accomplished judicially, would the
reduction in one case be the rule for all cases in the same jurisdiction, or
would the courts need to determine the reduction case by case? If the reduction were to be accomplished case by case, it would certainly be much more
costly than a determination of whether the plaintiff had exercised reasonable
efforts to mitigate. If the reduction for all cases were to be accomplished in
one fell swoop, it would require a kind of inquiry for which courts are ill
suited.
the promisee is “required to incur ‘only slight expense and reasonable effort’ in mitigating
his damages”).
129. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 989-97 (explaining the shortfall between expectation damages and the indifference principle as a result of the way damages are computed in
practice, rules that foreclose uncertain and unforeseeable damages, and other factors).
130. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligations, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 967-69 (1983).
131. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1154.
132. Id. at 1153-54.
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Courts are accustomed to and capable of making retail determinations
of reasonableness and fault, and a judgment about mitigation is no harder to
reach than any other judgment a court makes about these issues. In contrast,
courts are unaccustomed to and incapable of making the sort of wholesale
determinations Craswell seems to suggest. Such a reduction could be accomplished by statute, but the legislature would then be entering an arena
that, generally speaking, has been regarded as better suited to the courts. In
either event, consider the massive amount of forum shopping that would
follow if some states went Craswell’s route and others did not, or if all
states went Craswell’s route but adopted different reductions. Of course,
that problem could be avoided by a federal statute, but the prospect of congressional action on an issue like this is not too appealing.
Furthermore, Craswell’s argument about adverse selection is inconsistent with his conclusion here. Craswell argues that a systematic reduction
in the damages available to promisees would serve as a kind of “strict liability on [promisees], making [them] bear the loss whether or not they have
behaved reasonably.” 133 Because of adverse selection, however, this sort of
strict liability would be inefficient: if damages for all promisees are systemically reduced, promisees who took reasonable steps to mitigate damages
would subsidize those who didn’t. As a result, many or most promisees
could be discouraged from mitigating, leading to increasingly inefficient
levels of mitigation.
D. A Remedial Regime Based on Expected-Wealth Effects
Still another alternative model, also proposed by Craswell, is based on
the premise that efficient precaution is achieved only when the promisor
takes into account the subjective value that the promisee places on incremental increases in precaution by the promisor, and the consequent decreases in the risk of breach:
Insofar as we are concerned with the wrongdoer’s incentive to take precautions, the
efficient level of damages cannot necessarily be derived from the value that victims
place on the entire loss they would suffer, as if they were being asked to accept that
loss with certainty. Instead, the efficient level of damages should be determined by
first finding the value that victims place on the specific reduction in risk that is under consideration—since this is all the difference those precautions will actually
make to the victims—and then working backwards from that value to come up with
the damage measure that gives the manufacturer the correct incentives. 134

We will call this the expected-wealth model.

133.
134.

Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1162.
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To make the argument more concrete, consider the following example,
which is based in part on an example that Craswell formulated.135 Suppose
that a manufacturer produces machines, and every buyer expects to suffer a
$10,000 loss if the manufacturer fails to deliver the machine. If a buyer is
rational and risk neutral, he will value all 1% reductions in the risk of delivery failure—say, from 25% to 24% or from 2% to 1%—at $100 (1% of
$10,000). However, Craswell observes, if a buyer experiences diminishing
marginal utility of wealth and therefore risk aversion, 136 a decline in the risk
of breach from 25% to 24% should be more valuable to him than a decline
from 2% to 1%, because he will have greater expected wealth from the contract when he faces only a 2% risk of breach (and therefore a 98% likelihood of performance) than when he faces a 25% risk of breach (and therefore only a 75% likelihood of performance). While a risk neutral buyer
would value all these reductions in risk at $100, a risk-averse buyer might
value some of them differently.
So, for example, imagine that because of diminishing marginal utility,
a buyer values a reduction in risk from 25% to 24% at $105 instead of $100.
Then following Craswell’s argument, if the aim of expectation damages is
to give the promisor efficient incentives to take precaution, damages for
breach should be $10,500, rather than the $10,000 that expectation damages
would provide. The reason is that if damages were set at $10,500, the manufacturer would have the proper incentive to spend $105 on a given precaution: investment in the precaution has an expected payoff to the manufacturer of $105 because it reduces by 1% the likelihood of its having to pay
$10,500 in damages. In contrast, damages of $10,000 give the manufacturer
an incentive to spend only $100 per machine on the precaution. Therefore, it

135. Id. at 1160-62.
136. The connection between risk aversion and wealth has to do with economists’
definition of “risk aversion.” One ordinarily thinks of the concept of risk aversion as involving broad disfavoring of risks and losses for many psychological reasons, but economists
typically mean something narrower by it. They say that the reason a rational person would
prefer to avoid risk is that because of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, a 50/50
chance of getting $90 or $110 is in fact worth less than $100 (because the difference between
$110 and $100 is less than the difference between $100 and $90). To put it more starkly:
even if people were purely rational and had no emotional reasons for disfavoring risk or
overweighting losses compared to gains, they wouldn’t risk their one dinner tonight for an
even chance between zero dinners and two dinners tonight. Zero dinners would be much
worse than one, whereas two dinners wouldn’t be much better than one. This isn’t just a
result of psychological disfavoring of risk; it’s a result of the value of two meals versus one
versus zero. The same is often true of money, particularly if the sums are large enough. Accordingly, even purely rational people would be expected to turn down many fair, or even
favorable, bets as long as they experience a diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
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might not spend a greater amount to reduce the risk of breach from 25% to
24%, even though this reduction is worth $105 to the buyer. 137
Like other alternative contract-damages models, this model is unadministrable. It would be nearly impossible to measure the subjective valuations that buyers put on slight reductions in the risk of breach. It would also
be nearly impossible to isolate these slight effects from the much larger
effects caused by preexisting wealth differences among promisees. A buyer
with a net worth of $10 million will likely value any given increase in precaution much less than would a buyer with a net worth of $100,000, and
these preexisting wealth differences are likely to swamp the differences in
wealth that result from differences in expected losses from breach.138 Perhaps Craswell would suggest that these other wealth effects should be accommodated too, but a remedial regime that considers such effects would
break sharply from the common-law tradition against basing nonpunitive
damages on a party’s wealth. 139
Moreover, because Craswell’s goal is to give promisors efficient incentives, under his model the subjective valuations of those promisees that
happen to suffer harm from breach should not be controlling. 140 To provide
the efficient incentives that Craswell seeks to attain here, courts would have
to average the subjective valuations of all of a seller’s promisees, and courts
are particularly ill-equipped to make bulk determinations about the subjective valuations of individuals who are not parties. In other words, Craswell’s
proposal depends not only on impossible-to-measure subjective valuations
that a promisee puts on a promisor’s precaution, but even worse, on the im-

137. Under a remedial regime that perfectly implements the indifference principle,
promisees would face no risk of loss from breach, and therefore would be indifferent between a 25%-to-24% reduction, a 2%-to-1% reduction, or any similar reduction. At least
theoretically, then, the indifference principle solves the problem that Craswell here addresses. But, because in practice damages are imperfect, it is fair to assume, as Craswell does, that
promisees face some risk from breach. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 989-97 (explaining the
various reasons expectation damages will fall short of the indifference principle in practice).
138. Moreover, individuals tend to undervalue costs that may appear in the future,
reducing even further the relevance of wealth effects based exclusively on expected costs
deriving from the risk of breach. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and
the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 222-25 (1995). Put simply, actual large wealth
effects will swamp speculative small ones, perhaps to the point where it is unlikely the latter
even exist.
139. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice
of Efficient Civil Liability Rules, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (1988) (“[A] given loss reduces the utility of a rich person less than a poor person . . . [but this is a consideration] that
by long historical tradition in common law civil disputes the courts are supposed sedulously
to eschew. If they were now to become influential in determinations of liability, they would
cast courts in a radically new role.”).
140. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1169.
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possible-to-measure subjective valuations of a group of promisees who are
not in court. 141
E. Remedial Regimes Designed to Promote Efficient Behavior in Civil Dispute Resolution
Craswell has also identified a number of ways that contract law’s remedial regime can influence parties’ behavior in civil dispute resolution. 142
These effects tend to have opposing consequences. For instance, Craswell
notes that damages measures that result in lower damages lead initially to
fewer lawsuits because the expected value of any given lawsuit declines—
and this is desirable, because it reduces litigation costs. 143 As a consequence,
however, wrongdoers expect to pay less damages for their wrongs, which
will lead them to cause more harm, which in turn tends to increase the number of lawsuits “even while the probability of any particular wrong being
litigated had declined.”144
Similarly, Craswell suggests that higher damages might increase litigation or collection costs because they could cause courts and juries to demand more proof, encourage defendants to invest more in litigation, or encourage defendants to find more elaborate ways to hide their assets.145 But
higher damages also deter wrongs, and when there are fewer wrongs, plaintiffs have less reason to file claims; as a result, litigation costs may fall. The
141. Another problem with Craswell’s endeavor is that it does not properly accommodate the time interval between precaution and breach. For Craswell’s proposed regime to
be effective, it would have to influence the seller’s decision at the time when she has the
opportunity to take the precaution. Imagine that we could determine efficient incentives for
the manufacturer to take a particular decision during the course of manufacture that would
reduce the risk of breach from 25% to 24%. Suppose the window of opportunity to take this
precaution runs from March 1 to March 31. Courts, when awarding damages, would aim to
influence the seller’s decisions during that interval. As a result, courts could not take into
account any information that became available after March 31—including, say, information
about buyers’ new subjective values. But if damages awarded in the present are based on
figures from the past, then they can give sellers perverse incentives for precaution in the
present. For example, even if courts could calculate damages that provide the seller ideal
incentives in March, this level of damages could give the manufacturer inefficient incentives
to take an unrelated precaution in April or to recall a defective product in October (in view of
the product’s then-estimated danger and the value that buyers place on being safe from this
danger). In March, when the manufacturer has the opportunity to take the relevant precaution, she would need to consider the subjective values of her buyers in and after September.
But during the manufacture of a good, the class of buyers is often indeterminate: the very
identities of the buyers are unclear, and even the rough characteristics of buyers in bulk may
change during the course of a product’s design and manufacture.
142. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1169-70.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1170.
145. Id.
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elusive nature of these effects, and the fact that they point in opposite directions, suggests that they matter little for any practical analysis of contract
law’s remedial regime.
CONCLUSION
In a well-known essay, Milton Friedman claimed that the task of positive economics is “to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to
make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances.” 146 Correspondingly, Friedman claimed, the validity of the assumptions underlying an economic model should not be judged by evaluating the
assumptions directly. Instead, the assumptions should be judged according
to whether the model yields sufficiently accurate predictions.147
Neither of Friedman’s claims normally applies to law-and-economics
remedial models. These models are almost invariably prescriptive, not predictive: their purpose is either to support an existing rule or to argue that an
existing rule should be modified or replaced. To put this differently, lawand-economics remedial models are usually normative, not positive. The
prescriptive nature of these models is not a strike against them: there is
nothing wrong with developing prescriptive rather than predictive models.
However, the prescriptive nature of the models has three important implications.
To begin with, Friedman’s claim that the validity of the assumptions
underlying an economic model should be judged by the accuracy of the
model’s predictions cannot support most remedial models, because it is almost impossible to empirically determine the efficiency effects of continuing, modifying, or replacing an existing remedial rule. As Eric Posner has
pointed out:
To generate predictions, one would need a vast amount of information about the
characteristics of the parties and the transactions. If one remedy is best when renegotiation costs are high, and another is best when renegotiation costs are low, we
need some way to measure renegotiation costs. If the optimal remedy depends on
the shape of probability distributions for sellers’ costs and buyers’ valuations, we
need this information as well. Yet no one has attempted to collect this information,
and it is difficult to imagine how this task could be accomplished. 148

Accordingly, the validity of the assumptions that underlie a remedial
model, and the legal regime it supports, must be evaluated directly, on the
basis of prudential judgment, rather than by the model’s predictive success
146. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 4 (1953).
147. Id. at 15.
148. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 838 (2003).
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or formal validity. In law-and-economics—as opposed to straightforward
microeconomics—the formal validity of a model is only a first test. Other
tests are whether the legal regime suggested by a model is administrable,
whether the model takes institutional considerations into account, and
whether implementation of the model would involve more costs than benefits. Recent proposed alternatives to the expectation measure fail these tests.
Finally, each proposed alternative remedial model focuses on one or at
most two remedial goals and disregards the rest.149 As a result, the goal or
goals on which each model is based, and the remedial regime the model
promotes, usually conflict with the goals on which other models are based
and the regimes the other models promote. Such conflicts can be resolved
only by giving primacy to one or two goals over the others. The choice of
which goal or goals should be given primacy cannot be resolved by analyzing the formal validity of the models that are driven by those goals or by
measuring the extent to which the models are predictively sound. Accordingly, to the extent the choice among goals is instrumental, the issue of primacy can be resolved only by the application of sound prudential judgment
concerning the importance of each goal in efficiency terms. Our own judgment, which we believe is widely shared, is that the goals of achieving efficient rates of precaution and performance and supporting surplus-enhancing
reliance are more weighty—indeed, far more weighty—than the goals to be
served by any of the alternative models.

149.
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